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The temporal priority principle states that all causes must precede their effects. It is
widely assumed that children’s causal reasoning is guided by this principle from early in
development. However, the empirical studies that have examined children’s use of the
principle, most of which were conducted some decades ago, in fact show inconsistent
ﬁndings. Some researchers have argued that 3-year-olds reliably use this principle, whereas
others have suggested that it is not until 5 years that children properly grasp the inviolability
of the principle. To examine this issue, 100 children, 50 three-year-olds, and 50 four-year-
olds, took part in a study in which they had to judge which of two causes yielded an effect.
In the task, children saw one event (A), an effect (E), and then another event (B).The events
A and B involved the rolling of balls down runways, and the effect E was a Jack-in-a-box
popping up.The extent to which E left a visible trace was also varied, because comparisons
across previous studies suggested that this may affect performance. As a group, 3- and
4-year-olds performed at above-chance levels, but performance improved with age. The
nature of the effect did not have a signiﬁcant impact on performance. Although some
previous studies suggested that 3-year-olds may be more likely to choose B rather than A
as a cause due to a recency effect, we found no evidence of this pattern of performance in
the younger group. Potential explanations of the age-related improvement in performance
are discussed.
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INTRODUCTION
Much of the recent research on children’s causal learning has
focused on their ability to use statistical information to make
causal inferences, with such learning modeled using the causal
Bayes net approach (e.g., Gopnik and Schulz, 2004; Gopnik et al.,
2004; Sobel et al., 2004; Gopnik, 2012; see Lu et al., 2008; Grif-
ﬁths and Tenenbaum, 2009 for more recent Bayesian approaches
to causal learning). Researchers in this tradition have typically
emphasized the good performance of young children in causal
learning tasks (see Gopnik and Schulz, 2004; Gopnik, 2012 for
review), suggesting developmental continuity in causal cognition.
However, important questions still remain about whether there
may be qualitative differences between younger and older chil-
dren’s causal abilities, with such differences being a theme of the
body of research on children’s causal cognition that pre-dated the
Bayesian approach (e.g., Shultz and Mendelson, 1975; Bullock,
1985; Corrigan and Denton, 1996; Schlottmann, 1999). In this
paper, we focus speciﬁcally on whether there are developmen-
tal changes in children’s grasp of the principle that causes must
precede effects.
The temporal priority principle in causal reasoning states that
causes always come before their effects in time, even though there
may appear to be some circumstances in which cause and effect
appear perfectly contemporaneous (for example, when we press a
button on a TV remote, or turn the volume up or down on the
radio). Although somephilosophers have argued for the possibility
of backward causation (Dummett, 1954), in everyday life there
would never be a circumstance in which causal attributions would
knowingly be in breach of the temporal priority principle, i.e.,
adults would never choose the succeeding event as the cause of a
given effect. As this principle, and causal cognitionmore generally,
is fundamental for success in the world which surrounds us, it is
important that we determine the age at which the inviolability of
the principle is properly appreciated.
Most of the studies that examined children’s use of the tem-
poral priority principle did so in the 1970s and 1980s (Shultz
and Mendelson, 1975; Kun, 1978; Bullock and Gelman, 1979;
Sophian and Huber, 1984). However, in recent years there has
been a resurgence of interest in investigating temporal cues to
causation in both adults’ and children’s judgments (Buehner and
May, 2004; Lagnado and Sloman, 2004, 2006; Buehner, 2005;
Buehner andMcGregor, 2006; Burns andMcCormack, 2009; Gre-
ville and Buehner, 2010; Frosch et al., 2012). Some of these studies
have addressed whether children and adults will infer the struc-
ture of events in a causal system, based on the temporal pattern
in which events occur (Lagnado and Sloman, 2004, 2006; Burns
and McCormack, 2009; Frosch et al., 2012), whereas others have
examined how the temporal contiguity of an event and an out-
come affect causal strength judgments (Buehner and May, 2004;
Buehner, 2005; Buehner and McGregor, 2006). In both of these
sorts of studies, it is assumed that participants’ causal judgments
will respect the temporal priority principle. However,we canquery
whether such an assumption is appropriate with respect to young
children.
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As we have mentioned, most of the empirical research into
children’s use of the temporal priority principle was conducted
some decades ago, conclusions were drawn on the few studies con-
ducted, and then the issue was then evidently laid to rest. Based
on these studies, review papers such as that of Bullock et al. (1982)
have drawn clear conclusions about the age at which young chil-
dren respect the principlewhenmaking causal judgments (Bullock
et al., 1982; Burns and McCormack, 2009). The study that is most
frequently referred to is that of Bullock and Gelman (1979), which
found that children as young as 3 years of age chose a tempo-
rally prior event as the cause of an effect more often than would
be expected by chance. Based on their ﬁndings, researchers will
typically assume that 3-year-olds are capable of understanding the
fact that causes always precede effects in time (Bullock et al., 1982).
However, on closer inspection of studies investigating the tempo-
ral priority principle, it is apparent that despite the principle’s
fundamental nature, the empirical evidence regarding children’s
ability to adhere to this principle in their causal judgments ismixed
(Shultz and Mendelson, 1975; Kuhn and Phelps, 1976; Kun, 1978;
Bullock and Gelman, 1979; Shultz et al., 1986). Indeed, we would
argue that on the basis of the current evidence available, it is not
clear at what age children properly appreciate the principle when
making causal judgments.
One possible reason for the mixed pattern of ﬁndings is
that the most common studies referred to in the literature have
included relatively small sample sizes. For example, in Bullock
and Gelman’s (1979) study, there were only 16 children in each
age-group and in Shultz and Mendelson’s (1975) study there
were only 18 in each age-group. Given the potential variabil-
ity in performance by young children, differences in ﬁndings
between studies could reﬂect characteristics of children in the
samples. Arguably, these sample sizes are potentially not sufﬁ-
cient to provide a true or detailed representation of performance
of the age-groups examined, and we included much larger sam-
ple sizes in the current study. Moreover, it is clear that, looking
across the studies, researchers who have investigated children’s
use of the temporal priority principle have sometimes used very
different methodologies. Most notably, some researchers asked
children questions about pictures of familiar event sequences,
whereas others used novel mechanical events and asked children
to make causal attributions. This makes it difﬁcult to directly
compare each study, and draw ﬁrm conclusions based on their
ﬁndings.
One technique used to examine children’s use of the temporal
priority principle involves two events, event A and event B, with
children being required to choose the event that caused the other
event to occur (Sophian and Huber, 1984; Shultz et al., 1986).
Shultz et al. (1986) found that 3- to 4-year-olds failed to do this
correctly when making causal judgments. However, one problem
with the methodology in Shultz et al.’s (1986) study may be that,
for some of the trials, A caused B to occur, while in other trials
the causal order was reversed. Thus, there was not one standard
cause and one standard effect. This could have been confusing
for young children, and may have led to random responding. In
many everyday scenarios, the roles of cause and effect cannot be
reversed; for example, pressing a switch will cause the light to turn
on but the light turning on does not cause the switch to be pressed.
This suggests that the technique may not be the most appropriate
one to use when investigating temporal priority.
A second technique involved presenting children with pictures
depicting sequences of events, and children were then asked ques-
tions about causality (Kun, 1978; Das Gupta and Bryant, 1989).
For example, Kun (1978) presented 4.5-, 6-, 7-, and 8-year-olds
with 10 sets of three picture cards in the form “A caused B caused
C,” where A was the antecedent of B and C was the consequent of
B. For instance, one set of cards depicted a child pulling a dog’s
tail (A); the dog biting the child (B); the child crying (C). Children
were then asked three questions: what happened next (pointing
at B), why did B happen, and a non-sense question. They simply
had to point to the picture that answered the question. Kun (1978)
found that children as young as 4 years answered these questions
in a way that suggested that they understood the temporal priority
principle: that is, they were able to choose the correct antecedent
and consequent of B. A potential issue with this experiment is that
many of the sequences presented to the children may have been
familiar to them due to previous experiences and exposure to the
events. Hence, the children may have already developed schemas
about the events and the consequences of many actions, which
might affect how they respond in this experiment.
A third technique that overcomes the problems identiﬁed with
both of the other techniques, and is the one which was adopted by
the current study, is what we have termed the A–E–B paradigm.
This technique has been used in a number of previous studies
(Shultz and Mendelson, 1975; Bullock and Gelman, 1979; Bul-
lock et al., 1982; Sophian and Huber, 1984). It requires children
to draw inferences about which of two possible events (A or B)
caused an outcome. For example, children are shown a poten-
tial cause A, followed by effect E, and then potential cause B. In
this case, the correct response is to choose A as the cause as it
precedes effect E. Advantages of this paradigm are that, ﬁrst, the
events and sequences used in the paradigm can be chosen to be
novel to children. Thus, it removes the opportunity for children to
draw upon their knowledge of the causal power of familiar events.
Moreover, the roles of cause and effect are never switched, unlike
in the studies of Shultz et al. (1986) and Sophian andHuber (1984,
Experiment 1). Finally, the paradigm draws very little on verbal
abilities and so it cannot be argued that children’s comprehension
and verbal ability are confounding their performance.
Bullock and Gelman (1979) and Shultz and Mendelson (1975)
adopted this technique in their studies. Shultz and Mendelson
(1975) used three different pieces of equipment in their study, one
of which we will focus on here. This piece of equipment was a
wooden box with two holes on top at either end, with events A and
B being the dropping of marbles into the holes and the effect being
a bell ringing. Bullock and Gelman (1979) only used one piece of
apparatus in their study, but it was very similar to the piece of
equipment used by Shultz and Mendelson (1975). Bullock and
Gelman’s (1979) apparatus also involved a wooden box with two
holes on top of the box, at either end. The experimenter would
drop two balls into the holes (A or B) and children were then
required to decide which ball caused the effect (E). The sequence
always took the form A–E–B or B–E–A. Although in Shultz and
Mendelson’s (1975) study the effect (E) was a bell which rang
inside the box, in Bullock and Gelman’s (1979) study the effect
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was a teddy bear which popped up, giving a “Jack-in-the-box”
effect.
Shultz and Mendelson (1975) found that 6- to 7-year-olds and
9- to 11-year-olds chose the preceding event as the causewhereas 3-
to 4-year-olds were as likely to attribute the cause to the following
aswell as thepreceding event. In fact, Shultz andMendelson (1975)
compared the performance of younger 3-year-olds (aged 3 years 0
months to 3 years 7months) with the performance of older 3-year-
olds (3 years 8 months to 3 years 11 months) and, interestingly,
found that the younger 3-year-olds tended to erroneously choose
the event that occurredmost recently as the cause more often than
would be expected by chance. This in itself raises an issue: why
did younger 3-year-olds choose the most recent event as the cause,
rather than simply responding at random? Shultz and Mendelson
(1975) suggested that if young children do not understand the
temporal order of the cause and effect process they will choose
the event that is most salient to them, which in this case would
be the most recent event. In contrast, Bullock and Gelman (1979)
found that children as young as 3 years of age consistently chose the
preceding event as the cause. Thus, unlike the conclusion drawn by
Shultz andMendelson (1975); Bullock and Gelman (1979) argued
that their results suggest that children as young as 3 years old can
and do rely on temporal ordering when making causal judgments
(Bullock and Gelman, 1979). Also, like adults, they understand
that temporal priority dominates over all other cues, for example,
spatial contiguity (Bullock et al., 1982).
Considering both these studies used similar apparatus and a
similar methodology, it is surprising that they found such con-
tradictory results. Moreover, from these results, very different
conclusions have been drawn about the age when children fully
comply with the temporal priority principle. This prompted the
current study to investigate this issue further, in an attempt to
determine not only the age at which young children comply with
the temporal priority principle, but also to discover why Bul-
lock and Gelman (1979) and Shultz and Mendelson (1975) found
conﬂicting results.
There are small methodological differences that could poten-
tially provide an explanation for the differences in the results.
One notable difference is in relation to how the experimenters
obtained responses from children. Shultz and Mendelson (1975)
asked children a series of quite complex questions whereas Bul-
lock andGelman (1979) opted for amore simple responsemethod,
using questions that young children may have been more likely to
understand. In addition to this, although the apparatus used in
both studies included runways, it was only in Bullock and Gel-
man’s (1979) apparatus that the runways were actually visible
to children. Thus, there was a difference in spatiotemporal and
mechanism information between the two studies
There were two othermethodological differences thatmay have
potentially affected the amount of attention that children paid to
the B event in the sequence. In Bullock andGelman’s (1979) paper,
they stated that event B occurred “coincident with the start of the
Jack’s action,” i.e., that there was no delay between event E and
B, whereas in Shultz and Mendelson’s (1975) study, there was an
obvious delay between event E and event B. Moreover, the studies
differed in the extent to which the effect (E) left a visible trace once
it occurred in the sequence of events. In Shultz and Mendelson’s
(1975) study, the effect was a bell, which rang. There was no vis-
ible trace of the effect, and the bell had stopped ringing before
the second potential cause occurred. By contrast, in Bullock and
Gelman’s (1979) study, once the “Jack” popped up, it remained
up even when the second ball was released into the hole. It could
be argued that these variations – in the delay between B and E
and in the persistence of the causal consequence – may potentially
explain the difference in results obtained across these studies. In
particular, these differences may have had an inﬂuence on chil-
dren’s attention while they observed the sequence of events. In
Bullock and Gelman’s (1979) study, once the “Jack” popped up
and remained up, attention may have been so focused on the
“Jack” that children may not have witnessed the second ball being
released into the hole. Therefore, when asked to choose the ball
that made the “Jack” pop up, they may have chosen the ﬁrst ball
because this was the only ball that they had attended to. Con-
versely, as mentioned earlier, in Shultz and Mendelson’s (1975)
study the bell stopped ringing before the second ball was released
into the hole and so this may have allowed children to concen-
trate on the second ball and increased the likelihood it was chosen
as being causally relevant to the effect. Alternatively, it could be
argued that the persistent visibility of the “Jack,” and its intrinsic
interest to children, increased the salience of the effect which in
turn may have made it easier for the children to correctly recall
the order of events, and as a result, choose the correct event as the
cause.
It seems plausible that these variations in Shultz and Mendel-
son’s (1975) and Bullock and Gelman’s (1979) methodologies
could explain the difference in results, and that they could be
explored in an attempt to explain the variation in results. However,
more importantly, with regards the issues regarding existing stud-
ies thatwere raised earlier, it is appropriate to return to thequestion
of when children reliably appreciate the temporal priority princi-
ple in their causal reasoning. Thus the primary aim of the current
study was to attempt to determine the age at which young chil-
dren adopt the principle of temporal priority when making causal
judgments. Additionally we were interested in whether Shultz and
Mendelson (1975) were correct to argue that younger 3-year-olds
will tend to answer systematically incorrectly in this type of task,
by showing a recency effect in their causal judgments. The current
study used a large sample of children aged 3 and 4 years, with par-
ticipants assigned to one of two conditions. In one condition, the
“Jack up” condition, the effect involved a teddy popping up and
staying in view, whereas in the other condition, the “Jack down”
condition, the teddy bear popped up and then went down again.
The key difference between these conditions was in whether there
was a persistent visually available effect when the second possible
cause occurred.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
One hundred children took part in the study, ﬁfty 3-year-olds
(M = 43 months; range = 36–47 months) and ﬁfty 4-year-olds
(M = 53 months; range = 48–59 months). There were 64 females
and 36 males in total. Half of each age-group was randomly
assigned to one of two experimental conditions. Children were
recruited in local schools and preschools. All the children were
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FIGURE 1 | Diagram of the front view of the apparatus.
tested individually in the child’s school or preschool and each
child received a sticker for taking part.
APPARATUS
The apparatus consisted of a wooden box, 70 cm long, 21.5 cm
high, and 23 cm wide. On the left and right sides of the box
were plexiglass windows showing two runways inside the box. One
runway was painted red (the location of event A) and the other
runway was painted white (the location of event B) so children
could discriminate between the two. The runways were 30 cm
long, began at openings on the top outer corners of the box and
dropped at a 30◦ angle toward the center of the box. The runways
were a mirror image of each other (see Figure 1).
White and red wooden balls (2 cm in diameter) were placed
onto holders situated at the edge of the openings of the box. A
button could be pressed at each holder to release the ball into the
opening, and begin the sequence of events. When the balls were
released they rolled down the runways, disappeared from view,
and silently rolled into a compartment at the back of the box that
was easily accessible to the experimenter and out of sight from the
child.
On the topmiddle section of the apparatuswas a 10 cm× 10 cm
opening to which a lid was attached, and a teddy bear Jack-in-the-
box (event E) was located beneath this lid and could pop up from
it. Even though the ﬁrst event was manually instigated by the
experimenter, unbeknownst to children, the teddy bear popping
up and release of the second ball was driven by hidden motors
and built-in timers. This allowed for maximal control over the
sequence of events and their timing. The timing between A and
E, E and B (in an A–E–B sequence), and B and E, and E and A
(in a B–E–A sequence) was ﬁxed at 1.5 s between each event. By
means of a digital video recording, we estimated that the amount
of time a ball was visible as it rolled down a runway was 0.38 s.
Thus, once the ball was released into the runway (event A), it took
0.38 s for it to roll down the runway and disappear from view.
Then after another 1.12 s, the teddy bear popped up (event E).
Once the brief Jack-in-the-box event had ﬁnished, after another
1.5 s, ball B was released into the runway (event B), and 0.38 s later,
ball B disappeared from view.
DESIGN
There were two experimental conditions, labeled “Jack up” condi-
tion and “Jack down” condition. The design was between subjects
with children in each age-group randomly assigned to one of the
two experimental conditions. In both conditions, the sequence of
events was initiated by the experimenter pushing the button that
released the ball into the hole. In the “Jack up” condition, after
1.5 s, the Jack popped up and remained up (effect E), and after
another 1.5 s, the second ball was released into the hole. In the
“Jack down” condition, after 1.5 s, the Jack popped up and then
disappeared back down again under the lid. After another 1.5 s the
second ball was released into the hole.
PROCEDURE
At the beginning of the testing session, children were invited to
take a seat facing the box and were told that they were going to
play a game with the experimenter. They were introduced to the
“special box,” and then asked to name the colors of the runways
and the wooden balls. The children were then asked to watch
very carefully as the experimenter placed a wooden ball onto the
holder and released it into one of the runways. They watched
the experimenter initiate four training demonstrations (A–E, A–
E, B–E, B–E, or B–E, B–E, A–E, A–E, with order counterbalanced
across the groups) after which they were asked two closed, forced
choice questions. One was about ball A and the other about ball
B: “Did the white ball make the teddy bear pop up?” and “Did the
red ball make the teddy bear pop up?” This training phase was
included in order to demonstrate that either ball could potentially
cause the “Jack” to pop up. Thus, correct judgments at test had to
be based solely on the temporal order cues available to children.
If children answered these questions correctly the experimenter
moved onto the test trials, but if children answered incorrectly the
experimenter repeated the training phase again.
During the test trials, children saw four sequences of events.
They observed one ball being released into the runway, disappear,
the teddy bear popping up and then the second ball being released
into the runway. Although it looked to children that the experi-
menter released the ball, because the experimenter’s handwas held
directly behind the ball on its holder, in fact it was released by a
timing mechanism. Children saw the A–E–B sequence twice and
the B–E–A sequence twice. Thus, twice the correct answer was to
choose the red ball, and twice the correct answer was to choose
the white ball. The order in which the trials were presented was
randomized for each child. After each trial children were asked to
choose the ball that“made the teddybear popup.”No feedbackwas
given. Once participationwas complete, children were thanked for
their participation, given a sticker and were then returned to their
classroom.
RESULTS
Table 1 shows the mean number of times children chose the tem-
porally prior event in each of the two conditions. It is clear that
4-year-olds performed better in both conditions. The table also
shows that, for both age-groups, there appears to be very little
difference between how children performed in each of the two
conditions. Figure 2 shows the frequencies of correct responses of
3- and 4-year-olds collapsed across both conditions. The major-
ity of the 4-year-olds chose the temporally prior event in each
of the four trials: 41 performed perfectly compared to only 22
three-year-olds. An analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted
with between groups factors of condition and age-group. The
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Table 1 | Number of times children chose the temporally prior event
in each of the two conditions.
Age-group Jack-up Jack-down
Mean SD Mean SD
3 years 2.84 1.31 2.92 1.15
4 years 3.64 0.91 3.76 0.60
Scores can range from 0 to 4.
There were 50 children in each age-group.
results revealed no signiﬁcant main effect of condition and the
interaction between age-group and condition was also not signif-
icant, both Fs< 1. There was however a signiﬁcant main effect of
age-group F(1,99) = 15.90; p< 0.001. This result indicates that 4-
year-olds chose the temporally prior event signiﬁcantlymore often
than 3-year-olds. However, although 3-year-olds did not perform
as well as 4-year-olds, a one-sample t-test (with a test value of 2,
because children completed four trials) revealed that 3-year-olds’
performance was signiﬁcantly above chance, t = 5.09; df = 49;
p < 0.001. As would be expected, a one-sample t-test revealed
that 4-year-olds’ performance was also signiﬁcantly above chance,
t = 15.76; df = 49; p < 0.001.
In light of Shultz and Mendelson’s (1975) ﬁndings it was
decided to investigate 3-year-olds’ performance in more detail to
examine if the younger 3-year-olds were likely to attribute the
cause to the event that followed the effect rather than the event
that preceded the effect. For this analysis, the responses of the 23
youngest 3-year-olds (3 years, 1 month to 3 years, 7 months, M :
3 years, 4 months) were compared with those of the 27 oldest 3-
year-olds (3 years, 8 months to 3 years, 11 months, M : 3 years, 9
months). The mean number of correct responses for the younger
group was 2.78 in the Jack up condition and 2.64 in the Jack down
condition; means for the older group were 2.88 and 3.27, respec-
tively. A two-way ANOVA with factors of age (young versus old
3-year-olds) and condition revealed no signiﬁcant main effects or
interactions, all Fs < 1. Therefore, there was no signiﬁcant dif-
ference in how the younger 3-year-olds responded compared to
how the older 3-year-olds responded. In addition, we examined
the age of children who achieved each of the ﬁve possible scores;
Table 2 shows themean and range of these ages. It can be seen from
the table that the children who were likely to erroneously choose
the most recent event as the cause (those scoring 0 or 1) were not
notably younger than those who simply responded at chance levels
(scoring 2), and indeed that the groups of children with the higher
scores included some of the youngest children. Thus, there was
no indication in our data of a developmental shift from below-
chance to above-chance performance. In fact, Figure 2 clearly
shows that within the group as a whole, relatively few 3-year-olds
systematically chose the most recent event as the cause.
DISCUSSION
Adopting theA–E–Bparadigm, and using similar apparatus to that
used in two inﬂuential studies, we attempted to discover whether
the causal judgments of both 3- and 4-year-olds would reliably
reﬂect the principle that causes must always precede their effects
Table 2 | Age in months of children achieving each score.
Number correct
0 1 2 3 4
Jack up N = 3 N = 2 N = 6 N = 8 N = 31
Mean age 46.33 44.50 45.67 48.50 50.35
SD 4.51 3.54 2.73 6.48 5.82
Range 42–51 42–47 41–49 42–59 36–59
Jack down N = 1 N = 1 N = 10 N = 6 N = 32
Mean age 47 39 41.16 46.17 49.81
SD – – 6.53 6.68 5.42
Range – – 36–57 39–58 39–59
FIGURE 2 | Frequencies of correct responses by 3- and 4-year-olds
across the four experimental trials collapsed across both conditions.
in time. The key ﬁndings were that while children in both age-
groups judge that a preceding rather than a succeeding event was
the cause of an effectmore often thanwould be expected by chance,
there was a signiﬁcant developmental improvement in the num-
bers of correct responses between the two ages. In the study, we
also manipulated between two conditions whether or not the out-
come was one that was visually present at the time at which the
succeeding event occurred, because we had hypothesized that this
may affect the likelihood that children would perform well on
this task. However, there was no signiﬁcant difference in levels of
performance across the conditions.
The performance of the 4-year-olds was very good in both
conditions, with children’s judgments rarely defying the temporal
priority principle. Three-years-olds’ judgments were much less
likely to be correct. Although as a group they performed sig-
niﬁcantly above chance, Figure 2 shows something resembling
bimodal performance in this age-group, with around a quar-
ter of 3-year-olds performing at chance levels (two correct) and
just below a half of the group getting all questions correct. The
ﬁndings suggest that while some 3-year-olds seem to have ﬁrmly
grasped the temporal priority principle, others are not yet reliably
incorporating this principle in their causal judgments. Following
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Shultz and Mendelson’s (1975) analyses of younger versus older
3-year-olds’ performance, we examined whether the performance
of our 3-year-olds differed depending on their age. However, there
was no difference between how younger 3-year-olds performed
compared to older 3-year-olds. Moreover, there was no tendency
for young 3-year-olds to choose the succeeding event as the cause,
and thus, these ﬁndings are not consistent with those of Shultz
and Mendelson (1975).
In fact, our ﬁndings are not completely consistent with those
of either of the early studies that our paradigm is based on. Unlike
Bullock and Gelman (1979), we found that 4-year-olds performed
signiﬁcantly better than 3-year-olds. However, unlike Shultz and
Mendelson (1975), we found that the younger group as a whole
performed at above-chance levels. As it was found that the differ-
ence in the visibility of the “Jack” did not inﬂuence how children
responded, this suggestion can be discarded as an explanation
for the reason why these two previous studies found such con-
tradictory results. It may be the case that, as discussed earlier,
there are other procedural differences between the two previous
studies that could potentially account for the variance in their
results. Moreover, it should also be highlighted that we found
marked individual differences in children’s performance levels in
our 3-year-old group. Thus, the differences in ﬁndings between
the previous studies could also reﬂect the varying ability levels of
young children in the relatively small samples they tested.
It should be noted that the current study opted for a proce-
dure that differed from both Bullock and Gelman’s (1979) and
Shultz and Mendelson’s (1975) procedures (i.e., neither condition
in our study was an exact replication of either of their methodolo-
gies).We used simple questions like those of Bullock andGelman’s
(1979), as we felt that Shultz and Mendelson’s (1975) questioning
procedure was too complex. However, our procedure did differ
from that of Bullock and Gelman’s (1979) in that we left an obvi-
ous delay between event E and event B, in order tomatch the delays
between A and E and E and B (assuming an AEB sequence). We
note that in our procedure, even though these delays were identi-
cal, once B occurred the ball took a further 0.38 s to pass down the
runway and reach the Jack. Thus, the causally relevant component
of the B event (the ball reaching the Jack) was more temporally
separated from the effect than that of the A event. We deliberately
introduced a clear delay between E and B so that children’s atten-
tion would not be divided between E and B (which occurred in
different spatial locations). However, it might be argued that the
consequence of this – the different temporal contiguity between E
and the causally relevant components of the A and B events – may
have biased participants in favor of choosing A. One way to avoid
this problem would be to cover the runways up completely, so that
children simply see the balls being dropped into the box, and do
not see any additional visuo-spatial information. In fact, we have
carried out such a study (Rankin and McCormack, unpublished),
and found extremely similar results to those reported here.
An important question that remains is why the ability to consis-
tently apply the temporal priority principle improves signiﬁcantly
between 3 and 4 years. We can distinguish between at least
two possible explanations of the age effect: that changes reﬂect
improvements in information processing efﬁciency (a process-
ing explanation), or that changes reﬂect a new appreciation and
understanding of the temporal priority principle itself (a reason-
ing explanation). With regard to the former explanation, a likely
candidate process may be that of memory. Indeed, it has been
argued that memory limitations may contribute to the difference
in performance between 3- and 4-year-olds (Shultz and Mendel-
son, 1975; Kun, 1978; Koslowski and Masnick, 2002). It could be
the case that 3-year-olds cannot remember the order of the event
sequence in some trials, and, although they may be trying to use
the temporal priority principle in their judgments, they are more
likely tomake errors than 4-year-olds because theymis-remember
the sequence.
It seems likely that remembering event order and using this
information to make an inference places demands on young chil-
dren’s working memory resources. While the development of
working memory has been extensively explored across childhood,
we are only aware of a single study that has directly examined
how it may affect children’s causal judgments. McCormack et al.
(2013)measured workingmemory abilities alongside 4- to 7-year-
old children’s causal learning in the context of a quite different
causal learning task (one examining the cue competition effect
of blocking). They found that children’s performance on the task
was predicted by their working memory abilities over and above
chronological age and verbal ability. Thus, there is some evi-
dence that even relatively basic causal judgmentsmight be affected
by children’s working memory skills. We are currently exploring
whether this is also the case in a causal task similar to that used in
the present study.
It may also be the case that 3-year-olds’ understanding of causal
principles is not as advanced as 4-year-olds’. This suggestion draws
upon research that has investigated children’s use of temporal cues
to make causal inferences (McCormack and Hoerl, 2005, 2007;
McColgan and McCormack, 2008). The results from these studies
suggest that children’s may be able to represent or remember the
temporal order of events before they properly understand of the
causal signiﬁcance of this order. For example, McCormack and
Hoerl (2007) conducted a study in which children were required
to judge the outcome of a sequence of events based on the order
in which events A and B occurred. Children were introduced to
two dolls, John and Peter, and they were told that the dolls take
turns to do things but one doll (e.g., John) always goes ﬁrst and
the other doll (e.g., Peter) always goes last. Children were then
told that the dolls were going to go into a room to brush their hair.
The experimenter closed the door of the room so that the children
could not see what was happening, although the experimenter told
children that one doll brushed his hair, placed the hairbrush in one
cupboard in the roomwhen he was ﬁnished and that the other doll
retrieved the brush and then placed it in the other cupboard. After
this, the test phase commenced where the experimenter placed
each doll beside the picture of the cupboard that he had put the
brush into, and children were required to decide which cupboard
the brush was in now. McCormack and Hoerl (2007) were inter-
ested to see if children couldmake the appropriate inference about
the current location of the brush based on the temporal order in
which the dolls had taken their turn, even though children did not
directly see the dolls take their turn in front of them.
McCormack andHoerl (2007) found that 5-year-olds were suc-
cessful at choosing the correct location, but 4-year-olds were at
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chance, suggesting that 4-year-olds’ ability to reason about the
temporal order of the events was not as advanced as that of 5-
year-olds. This ﬁnding suggests that it may be the case that young
children can only perform successfully when they can see the
events unfold in front of them. McCormack and Hoerl (2007)
provided some evidence for this suggestion by repeating the exper-
iment with 3-year-olds, with the apparatus set up in such a way so
that children could see the events unfold in front of them. In this
condition, even 3-year-olds chose the correct location. From these
ﬁndings, McCormack and Hoerl (2007) argued that it is actually
viewing sequences of events occur in front of them unfolding in
a certain order that allows young children’s judgments to reﬂect
the order in which events occurred, rather than their ability to
represent and then reason about event order (see alsoMcCormack
and Hoerl, 2005; McColgan and McCormack, 2008; Hoerl and
McCormack, 2011)
McCormack and Hoerl (2007) put forward a suggestion that
may explain how young children perform successfully on reason-
ing tasks where they can view the sequence in front of them. They
suggested that when young children (around the age of 3–4 years)
view causal sequences, such as the A–E–B sequence of events, they
make a causal judgmentwithout necessarily attending to or reﬂect-
ingon the entire event sequence.Young childrenmayoperate along
the lines of a default: when making causal judgments, they ignore
any event which occurs after the effect E. It may be the case that
once children see the effect E, theymay no longer encode the rest of
the sequence as causally relevant. Thus, when asked causal ques-
tions they may not even consider event B in the sequence, and
so will automatically choose event A as the cause. McCormack
and Hoerl (2007) termed this process an encoding default pro-
cess. They argued that this process is non-insightful and does not
require an explicit understanding about the role of temporal order
in determining the causal structure of events. It usually leads to
successful performance because the temporal order in which they
see the events is also the causal order. However, this account would
assume that young children do not have an explicit grasp of why
one event is the cause and another event is not the cause, that is,
they have not grasped the signiﬁcance and logical force of causal
order.
McCormack and Hoerl (2007) distinguished between such an
encoding default process andmaking temporal priority judgments
by reasoning about order. They suggested that older children and
adults reﬂect on thewhole sequence, recall the order based on their
memory for the event sequence, and choose the causally efﬁcacious
event based on an understanding about temporal priority and the
temporal order of events. If children possess this ability, then they
should never make errors when it comes to choosing the causally
efﬁcacious event providing they can remember the order in which
the events happened.
Thus, in relation to the ﬁndings from the current study, it
may be the case that 3-year-olds are operating along the lines of
an encoding default process. As a group they are above chance
in choosing the correct event as the cause because the temporal
order is the same as the causal order, and because they can see
the events unfolding in front of them. In order to account for
developmental improvements in performance, we need to assume
that this encoding process does not always function optimally (i.e.,
that children do not always encode A as a causally relevant event).
If this is correct, 3-year-olds, when faced with the test question,
will sometimes ﬁnd themselves with no previously encoded infor-
mation about what is causally relevant. Moreover, if they lack an
explicit grasp of the temporal priority principle, they will have
no basis on which to make an inference, even if they can recall
the order in which the events occurred, and will have to guess. In
contrast, 4-year-olds are more successful as they are able to reason
about event order, putting to work the principle that causes always
precede effects, which will inevitably yield the correct answer. This
could be further explored by covering the entire event sequence,
and then informing children afterward about the order in which
the balls had been dropped. If children are basing their judgments
on something like an encoding default process, then they should
struggle to choose the temporally prior event if they cannot see the
events unfold in front of them. By contrast, if children are reason-
ing about event order based on their explicit understanding that
causes precede effects, then we would expect to ﬁnd that children
would successfully choose the temporally prior event even under
these circumstances.
We have distinguished between two possible reasons for some
3-year-olds’poorer performance: that theymay have poorermem-
ory skills or that they may lack an explicit grasp of the nature
of the temporal priority principle. In the current study, we did
not actually ask children to recall the order in which the events
had occurred (though see Sophian and Huber, 1984), but assess-
ing children’s memory for the event sequence along with their
causal judgments may in fact be critical in distinguishing between
these two explanations. If memory problems underpin children’s
difﬁculties in the task, then we would expect to see a close rela-
tionship between the accuracy of memory for the event sequence
and causal judgments, such that when children choose B as the
incorrect cause they also are likely to erroneously report the order
in which events occurred. Such a pattern of performance would
suggest that children do understand the temporal priority prin-
ciple but have difﬁculty putting it to work because of problems
remembering event order. Alternatively, it may be that, at least for
younger children, there is no close relationship between memory
performance and performance on the causal task: e.g., younger
children may get causal questions wrong but get memory ques-
tions correct. This second pattern of performance would suggest
that children do not fully appreciate the temporal priority princi-
ple. Indeed, if young children’s causal judgments are underpinned
by an encoding default process, we might expect there to be no
close relationship between memory for event order and causal
judgments, because the latter would not be based on the former.
Rather, children’s causal judgments would reﬂect the extent to
which they encoded each of the previous events as causally relevant
at the time at which the events unfolded.
The fact that we have found development improvements in
such a basic aspect of causal learning indicates that there may
be important age-related changes in causal cognition that may
be overlooked within the causal Bayes net approach that cur-
rently dominates developmental research in this area (Gopnik
and Schulz, 2004; Gopnik et al., 2004). The Bayesian account
is a computational approach that does not aim to describe the
psychological processes involved in causal inference, therefore,
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as it stands, the issue of whether 3-year-olds’ problems stem
from memory difﬁculties or conceptual problems is not one that
Bayesian theorists need take a stance on. Indeed, Gopnik (2012)
argues that even preschoolers’ causal inferences typically resemble
those of an idealized Bayesian learner. Nevertheless, it could be
argued that the very existence of developmental improvements in
performance, such as those reported here, makes it pressing to
identify what the important underlying processing changes are.
In conclusion, it has been shown that there is a differ-
ence between how 3- and 4-year-olds perform in a simple
causal paradigm, with 4-year-olds performing signiﬁcantly bet-
ter than 3-year-olds. However, unlike ﬁndings from previous
research, we found that even young 3-year-olds are unlikely
to show a recency effect in their causal judgments. It is the
more random performance of a sub-group of 3-year-olds that
requires a developmental explanation. Our ﬁnding suggests that
either that 3-year-olds’ understanding about the temporal pri-
ority principle is not as advanced as that of 4-year-olds, or
that they fail to remember the order in which the events have
occurred.
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